James P. Scanlan, Attorney at Law

Home Page

Curriculum Vitae

Publications

Published Articles

Conference Presentations

Working Papers

Journal Comments

Truth in Justice Articles

Measuring Health Disp

Outline and Guide to MHD

Summary to MHD

Solutions

Solutions Database

Irreducible Minimums

Pay for Performance

Between Group Variance

Concentration Index

Gini Coefficient

Reporting Heterogeneity

Cohort Considerations

Relative v Absolute Diff

NHDR Technical Issues

MHD A Articles

MHD B Conf Presentations

MHD D Journal Comments

Consensus/Non-Consensus

Institutional Corresp

Scanlan's Rule

Outline and Guide to SR

Summary to SR

Semantic Issues

Employment Tests

Case Study

Case Study Answers

Subgroup Effects

Illogical Premises

Illogical Premises II

Inevitable Interaction

Feminization of Poverty S

Explanatory Theories

Mortality and Survival

Immunization Disparities

Truncation Issues

Collected Illustrations

Income Illustrations

Framingham Illustrations

Life Table Illustrations

NHANES Illustrations

Credit Score Illustration

Representational Disp

Statistical Signif SR

Comparing Averages

Meta-Analysis

Case Control Studies

Mortality and Survival 2

Measures of Association

Educational Disparities

Nuclear Deterrence

Employment Discrimination

Job Segregation

Measuring Hiring Discr

Disparate Impact

Four-Fifths Rule

Lending Disparities

Disparities - High Income

Underadjustment Issues

Lathern v. NationsBank

Holder/Perez Letter

Discipline Disparities

Disparate Treatment

Los Angeles SWPBS

Suburban Disparities

Disabilities - PL 108-446

NEPC Colorado Study

NEPC National Study

Duncan/Ali Letter

Feminization of Poverty

Affirmative Action

Affirm Action for Women

Other Affirm Action

Justice John Paul Stevens

Statistical Reasoning

The Sears Case

The AT&T Consent Decree

Cross v. ASPI

Vignettes

Times Higher Issues

Gender Diff in DADT Term

Adjustment Issues

Percentage Points

Odds Ratios

Statistical Signif Vig

Journalists & Statistics

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Outline and Guide

Misconduct Summary

B1 Agent Cain Testimony

B1a Bev Wilsh Diversion

B2 Bk Entry re Cain Call

B3 John Mitchell Count

B3a Obscuring Msg Slips

B3b Missing Barksdale Int

B4 Park Towers

B5 Dean 1997 Motion

B6 Demery Testimony

B7 Sankin Receipts

B7a Sankin HBS App

B8 DOJ Complicity

B9 Doc Manager Complaints

B9a Fabricated Gov Exh 25

B11a DC Bar Complaint

Letters (Misconduct)

Links Page

Misconduct Profiles

Arlin M. Adams

Jo Ann Harris

Bruce C. Swartz

Swartz Addendum 2

Swartz Addendum 3

Swartz Addendum 4

Swartz Addendum 7

Robert E. O'Neill

O'Neill Addendum 7

Paula A. Sweeney

Robert J. Meyer

Lantos Hearings

Password Protected

OIC Doc Manager Material

DC Bar Materials

Temp Confidential

DV Issues

Document Storage

Pre 1989

1989 - present

Presentations

Prosec Misc Docs

Prosec Misc Docs II

Profile PDFs

Misc Letters July 2008 on

Large Prosec Misc Docs

HUD Documents

Transcripts

Miscellaneous Documents

Unpublished Papers

Letters re MHD

Tables

MHD Comments

Figures

ASPI Documents

Web Page PDFs

Pages Transfer


Illogical Premises II:  The Rate Ratio as a Measure of Association

(Feb. 19, 2010)

Prefatory note:  This page is related to the Illogical Premises, Inevitability of Interaction, and Subgroup Effects sub-pages of the Scanlan’s Rule page of jpscanlan.com. 

 

The Illogical Premises sub-page of the Scanlan’s Rule page of jpscanlan.com discusses that it is illogical to consider it somehow normal that a factor that affects the likelihood of experiencing an outcome will cause equal proportionate changes in different baseline rates of experiencing the outcome.  Specifically, it is not  possible for a factor to cause equal proportionate changes in different baseline rates of experiencing an outcome and cause equal proportionate changes in rates of experiencing the opposite outcome.  Since there is no more reason to expect that two group with different baseline rates of experiencing an outcome will experience equal proportionate changes in those rates than there is to expect them to experience equal proportionate changes in the opposite outcome rate, there is no reason to regard it as somehow normal that the two groups will experiences equal proportionate changes in either outcome.   The Inevitability of Interaction sub-page discusses that in a clinical study when two subgroups have different baseline rates of experiencing an outcome, interaction always will be observed either as to the outcome or the opposite outcome because if the two groups will experience the same proportionate change in one outcome they necessarily will experience different proportionate changes as to the opposite outcome.

This item illustrates the same essential point with regard to the rate ratio as a measure of association.  Table 1 is based on Table 3 of the 2008 British Society for Population Studies presentation.  That table was intended to illustrate that at different prevalence levels various rate ratios (1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0) mean different things with regard to the comparative status of two groups.  While the illustration in cast in terms of the differences between a disadvantaged and advantaged group with respect to an outcome, the illustration could as well be read as showing the strength of the association between membership in the disadvantaged group and the likelihood of experiencing the outcome.  The actual difference between the groups (actual strength of association) is reflected in the EES column, which presents values derived by the method described on the Solutions sub-page of Measuring Health Disparities page of jpscanlan.com. 

A FavRatio column has been added to show the ratio of the advantaged group’s rate of experiencing the favorable outcome (test passage in the hypothetical) to the disadvantaged group’s rate of experiencing the favorable outcome.  Thus, the table illustrates that it would be illogical to regard a particular rate ratio to reflect the same degree of association in the case of different baseline rates since if the rate ratios are the same as to different baseline rates the rate ratios will necessarily be different as to the opposite outcome rate.  .

Table 1  Illustration of Meaning of Various Ratios at Different Prevalence Levels.

AdvRatioDGFailRateAGFailRateEESFavRatio
1.20 59.90% 50.00% 0.26 1.25
1.20 18.40% 15.40% 0.12 1.04
1.50 75.50% 50.40% 0.68 2.02
1.50 45.20% 30.20% 0.39 1.27
2.00 40.10% 20.10% 0.59 1.33
2.00 20.10% 10.00% 0.44 1.13
2.00 1.00% 0.50% 0.24 1.01
2.50 24.20% 9.70% 0.6 1.19
2.50 7.40% 2.90% 0.44 1.05
3.00 44.00% 14.70% 0.9 1.52
3.00 14.20% 4.80% 0.6 1.11
3.00 2.70% 0.90% 0.44 1.02

Possibly some would maintain, with respect to the first two rows for example, that the strength of the association between group membership and the adverse outcome is the same in the two rows while the strength of association between group membership and the opposite outcome is different in the two rows.  The decision of the National Center for Health Statistics to avoid the implications with respect to the measurement of  health disparities of the pattern whereby relative differences in favorable and adverse outcomes tend to change in opposite directions as the prevalence of an outcome changes (discussed, inter alia, in Section e.6 of the Scanlan’s Rule page and Section E.7 of MHD) may reflect an element of such thinking.  But such thinking is not defensible. 

One may note that in the table with respect to each adverse outcome rate ratio the larger the absolute difference between rates the larger is the EES.  That occurs because for any given rate ratio, the larger the absolute difference the larger will be the EES.  But it should not be deemed to suggest that the absolute difference is a sound measure of association.  See, e.g., the introductory material on the Scanlan’s Rule page and the Relative Versus Absolute sub-page of MHD.  As discussed on the Illogical Premises sub-page, it would not necessarily be illogical to regard the absolute difference as a sound measure of association.  But neither would it be correct to do so.